Archive for June, 2008

Is a parent responsible for the damage caused by their children?

Friday, June 27th, 2008

Yes. In Arizona, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-661 (2008) a judge can make the parents or legal guardians of a juvenile responsible for up to $10,000.00 for each “malicious or willful” tort caused by the juvenile. Prosecutors almost always require that plea bargains stipulate that the juvenile will be jointly and severally responsible for any damages caused by the juvenile and his or her co-defendants.

In my experience, this can often place the attorney for the juvenile between a rock and a hard place. For example, I’ve had several criminal damage cases were the juvenile has a very poor chance of winning a trial (numerous co-defendants and other witnesses willing to testify to the juvenile’s guilt) but I’ve been able to arrange a plea bargain that will either eventually dismiss the case against the juvenile or allow him or her to plead to a much less serious charge, thus preventing a felony conviction on his or her record. The parents are generally very pleased with that kind of plea agreement until I tell them they will be held personally responsible for any restitution that the juvenile cannot pay.

Is it my responsibility to only consider the juvenile’s interest (i.e. keeping a felony conviction off his or her record), or should I consider the entire family? The law is clear that I am only the attorney for the juvenile, though it is often difficult to ignore the financial burden a conviction can place on the entire family. It can be very stressful on a family when a parent is asking the juvenile to go to trial and the attorney is advising the juvenile otherwise.

Politics and the Supreme Court of the United States

Thursday, June 26th, 2008

The Supreme Court of the United States just decided District of Columbia v. Heller, holding that a District of Columbia prohibition on the possession of usable handguns in the home violated the Second Amendment to the Constitution. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, and Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined him. Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer were the dissenting Justices.

Two weeks ago, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Boumediene v. Bush, where it held that aliens designated as enemy combatants and detained at Guantanamo Bay have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. The dissenting Justices were Scalia, Roberts, Thomas, and Alito.

My understanding of these two cases is limited to having followed them in the news and read the opinions. What strikes me about them, like with many cases, is that I could have guessed who would fall on which side based solely on what I have heard about the Justices’ political leanings. I think it isn’t too far off for me to say that Scalia, Roberts, Thomas, and Alito would probably vote for a president who was pro-gun and anti-habeas for enemy combatants. I’d also say the opposite is probably true of Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.

I imagine this doesn’t seem like a problem to most people, but it bothers me. Although my legal education and experience as a lawyer has to some extent eroded my idealistic view of courts, I’d like to think that for the most part a judge looks at what the existing law requires and holds accordingly. In most cases, I feel like there is a superior legal argument for each issue, and about half of the time that superior argument achieves the result I want. A lot of times I win legal arguments I would not agree with if I was the judge, and sometimes I lose legal arguments where the law couldn’t be more clearly in my favor. I’ve lost count of how many times I’ve seen a pro-prosecutor judge rule in favor of the state with absolutely no legal grounds for doing so, but I’d like to think this country’s highest court is different.

Unfortunately, there are times when I seriously doubt that, politics aside, the Justices really believe the side they take has the best legal argument. It’s just too much of a coincidence for me to believe that the Justices happen to think the constitution requires exactly what their political leanings are on almost every issue. Sure, they usually look at issues with good arguments on both sides, but a smart enough lawyer can make pretty much any argument convincing enough to accept. I often worry that the Supreme Court of the United States might end up being nothing more than nine really smart advocates whose job is to find the most convincing legal theory to support their political agenda.

Wow

Monday, June 23rd, 2008

I hope this isn’t a rule here as well. Or do I?

Deviations and Personal Circumstances

Thursday, June 19th, 2008

I often write deviation letters to prosecutors. That is especially important in Maricopa County Superior Court, where deputy county attorneys are forced to follow strict and often ridiculous plea bargaining guidelines. In my experience with deviation letters, I have found that letters citing constitutional issues or exculpatory evidence are far more likely to get a deviation than those citing a client’s mitigating personal circumstances. While I can understand that a prosecutor would rather offer a better bargain than lose a case, it concerns me that prosecutors do not give much weight to a client’s otherwise spotless background, bad health, or personal responsibilities. To me it seems that a strong case for the State involving aberrant behavior and a victimless crime should be just as worthy of a deviation as a weak case for the State involving a victim and a defendant with a long criminal history.

Rules v. Standard Practice

Tuesday, June 17th, 2008

Recently, I amused a judge because I followed the text of a rule of criminal procedure instead of doing what everyone else in the jurisdiction does. He told me I deserved a “gold star,” and I’m not sure how I feel about that. According to the rule, which is very clear, I was responsible for editing a copy of a physicians report within 24 hours of receipt and returning it to the court so it could be made available to the State. Apparently, most attorneys just get the report, redact it at their leisure, and give it to the State a day or so before the hearing.

At every step of a case, I tend to look at the governing statue or rule whenever there might be a deadline or a specific way of doing something. That’s my policy no matter how well I think I know what to do, and it normally gives me a great deal of confidence that I am doing everything correctly. Unfortunately, it occasionally results in strange looks.

In a situation where I know the rule and would be violating it by following unwritten standard practice, should I stick to what’s written or follow the crowd? Personally, I can’t imagine ignoring an applicable rule, no matter how inexperienced full compliance makes me look.

Can you get a DUI in a car that doesn't work?

Monday, June 16th, 2008

A case that addressed that question, State v. Larriva, cited out-of-state authority for the proposition that “the inoperability of the vehicle does not preclude a finding of actual physical control,” later concluding “that the operability of the vehicle is only tangentially relevant to the determination of actual physical control.” In Larriva, the defendant was stuck on a curb and couldn’t move his car.

However, Larriva was later questioned in State v. Dawley, where the court stated in a footnote that “the facts on which we based our decision in Larriva would support a conviction on a theory of driving as shown by circumstantial evidence, as suggested by the special concurrence in that case, not on a theory of actual physical control.” Dawley was dealing with jury instructions, and the court thought the jury should have been instructed that the defendant was in “‘actual physical control’ of the vehicle if, based on the totality of the circumstances shown by the evidence, his potential use of the vehicle presented a real danger to himself or others.”

Although Dawley seems to prevent someone from ever getting a DUI in an inoperable car, I can imagine some prosecutor arguing that the court used the word “potential” before the word “use” in the jury instruction to avoid that result. In a broken-down or stuck vehicle, drunken “use” hardly presents a real danger to anyone. But if you consider that the vehicle might start or break free, couldn’t “potential use” present a real danger? Could the likelihood of the car eventually moving become a factor to consider? How do you reconcile that with the footnote in Dawley?

Brown & Little, P.L.C. Blog!

Friday, June 13th, 2008

We’ve decided to start a blog where we’ll discuss various issues related to the practice of criminal law in Arizona. It seems like we run into some kind of interesting issue almost every day, and it’s our goal to discuss those issues here. Hopefully we’ll each be able to post frequently, so keep checking back!